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THE POLITICS OF DEINDUSTRIALISATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TEXTILES 
AND CLOTHING SECTOR (1974-1984) 
ABSTRACT Deindustrialisation is taking an increasingly prominent place in public French 
discourses and has raised the question of the state’s capacity to spur the country’s industrial 
rejuvenation. This article views with scepticism the possibility for a state-led 
reindustrialisation as it finds that deindustrialisation has historically constituted an industrial 
strategy endorsed by French policy-makers themselves. More precisely, this article argues 
that deindustrialisation is an industrial strategy that involves a state-sponsored 
disengagement from specific manufacturing activities in order to rationalise the sector and 
render it apt to confront international competition. This strategy, as it is argued, is 
conditioned by two main factors: the scarcity of resources that can potentially be distributed 
to industrial firms and secondly the resistance of workers and businesses in declining sectors 
that threaten the political legitimacy of governments. To illustrate this claim the article 
proposes an examination of the Ministry of Industry’s archives between 1974 and 1984 in 
order to trace the process industrial policy-making enacted towards the Textiles and Clothing 
Sector. It is found that the consecutive governments of the decade under examination 
pursued a targeted deindustrialisation of the sector while simultaneously devising strategies 
aimed at minimising the political costs of this policy preference on the governing authorities. 
Keywords: deindustrialisation; political economy; industrial policy; manufacturing; 
textiles and clothing; Ministry of Industry 
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INTRODUCTION 
France’s economic landscape has undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Trentes 
Glorieuses owing in particular to the mutations experienced by its industrial sector. From 1974 
to 2014 the industrial sector has lost slightly more than 52% of its initial employment while 
its value-added contribution of its output to GDP has fallen from 23% in 1980 to 14% in 2015 
(INSEE, 2017). Stemming the deindustrialisation tide that has swept France’s economy for the 
past 40 years has become a leitmotiv adopted across the country’s political spectrum. During 
the 2012 electoral campaign Sarkozy’s ‘Made in France’ initiative aiming at encouraging the 
production of goods on French soil encountered Hollande’s proposal – and later adoption-  of 
a law set to limit plants' closures by forcing firms to find a buyer before shutting down any 
industrial site. In 2017, the electoral battle was still underscored by the theme of 
deindustrialisation. Macron proposed to continue the project of ‘Nouvelle France 
Industrielle’, launched while he was Minister of the Economy, in order to facilitate French 
industry’s transition towards high technology activities, while the state-spurred 
reindustrialisation of France figured as a prominent policy objective of both Le Pen’s and 
Melenchon’s programs. At the same time, bolstering domestic industrial capacities is 
increasingly gaining a privileged position among the French public opinion’s policy concerns 
(Fourquet, 2011). Deindustrialisation, one could argue, constitutes an undeniable ‘French 
obsession’ (Cohen and Buigues, 2014: 2). Despite the long-winded concern over France’s 
industrial performance, there has not been any trace of improvement in its competitiveness 
or any sign of reindustrialisation taking place in the near future (Artus, 2016). Central to the 
preoccupations over France’s industrial future is the debate over the capacity of the state to 
halt the course of industrial decline, instead of relinquishing its industrial policy autonomy 
and acquiescing to the reality of a deindustrialised economy. Indeed, recent calls for the 
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reindustrialisation of the country have stressed the strategic role to be held by the state in 
this process (Beffa, 2012; Levet, 2012). Clearly, any attempt to understand future of French 
industry necessitates an exploration of the links between industrial policy and 
deindustrialisation. 
The article begins by examining two common French approaches explaining the mechanisms 
of deindustialisation, the naturalist and the industriocratic approach. For the former, 
deindustrialisation constitutes a structural and inevitable phenomenon experienced by all 
mature capitalist economies. Industriocratic approaches highlight the economically noxious 
nature of deindustrialisation as manufacturing is perceived as the engine of growth of the 
national economy. While in essence both approaches see deindustrialisation as a process 
whereby winning and losing sectors are culled, they fail to account for the crucial role of the 
state in determining this selection process. In contrast, this article proposes an alternative 
definition of deindustrialisation which sees the latter neither as a merely structural 
transformation nor as industrial decline, but as a state-led strategy. Such a strategy involves 
a selective disengagement from certain manufacturing activities in order to induce a 
rationalisation process intending to redress the commercial performance of domestic 
industry. Even further, as a statecraft strategy deindustrialisation is moulded on the one hand 
by the international competitive pressures weighing upon domestic industry and on the other 
by the government’s need to secure its legitimacy by responding to the calls of the threatened 
sectors’ workers for protection.  
To illustrate these theoretical contentions this article proposes an examination of the French 
Ministry of Industry’s (MoI) archives in order to trace the process of industrial policy-making 
enacted towards the Textiles and Clothing (T&C) sector between 1974 and 1984.  Arguably, 
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this decade constitutes the ‘first wave of deindustrialisation' to hit the country (Thibault, 
2012: 58; Lamard and Stoskopf, 2009). Thus, an examination of industrial mutations during 
this period allows for a better appreciation of the historical origins of France’s ongoing 
deindustrialisation and the role of policy-makers in propelling it. Furthermore, archival 
investigation permits to better elucidate the internal and non-public debates that 
progressively shaped the policy preferences of state managers (Rogers, 2012: 14). Indeed, the 
analysis of primary government material can provide a substantial empirical basis on which 
to theorise (industrial) policy whose insights could be ultimately used to inform modern 
research on national (industrial) strategies for which such archives are not yet available 
(Kettell, 2004: 5).   The pertinence of the sectoral case study lies in the traditional view of T&C 
production as a comparative advantage of areas rich in cheap labour which render advanced 
economies unable to resist the mass migration of T&C capital towards developing countries. 
The archive-based evidence collected in the French National Archives indicates that in 
response to a global crisis of overproduction that put France in a particularly vulnerable 
position in the international T&C market, the consecutive governments in office during the 
decade under examination were consistently inclined towards a targeted deindustrialisation 
of the sector in order to foster domestic production around certain key industrial units within 
the sector and offset the devastating effects of a growing trade deficit.  
The sector’s historical experience is divided into three distinct periods which highlight the 
governments’ broader dilemma between the pursuit of political legitimacy and industrial 
rationalisation. From 1974 to 1979, the state relegated the financial responsibility for 
restructuring to an inter-professional body consisting principally of the representatives from 
the sector’s industrialists. The limited resources held by this committee was the principal way 
through which selectivity in aids attribution operated. The year before the 1981 elections 
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witnessed a sudden change of attitude from the part of the government which declared T&C 
as a key industrial priority.  In fact, the MoI discreetly devised a policy of industrial targeting 
aiming at identifying the key clusters of the sector to which industrial aids should be 
channelled in priority. Following Mitterrand’s ascendancy at the head of the Vth Republic, the 
socialist T&C strategy essentially consisted in slowing down the deindustrialisation strategy 
through a comparatively open and undiscriminating system of subsidisation. This strategy 
served as a means for the government to strengthen the electorate’s political support before 
adopting a stricter stance that allowed market competition to become the primary 
determinant of the devaluation process. 
While the experience of the T&C sector is insufficient to draw conclusions about the future of 
the totality of France's manufacturing sector, the article’s empirical investigation offers 
certain crucial insights for the study of deindustrialisation. Firstly, the decline and expansion 
of sectors is not structurally determined as naturalists would argue. Rather, the government's 
policy priorities play a detrimental role in shaping the trajectory of different industries.  
Secondly, and as a result the state is not a mere passive observer of the process of 
deindustrialisation. This suggests that the latter should not be merely viewed as a description 
or trend of French industry which the state must either counteract or acquiesce to but, as an 
industrial policy option in its own right that state managers are prone to deploy in certain 
sectors within a context of increasing internationalisation and scarce financial resources. 
FRENCH APPROACHES TO DEINDUSTRIALISATION 
To schematise the divergent approaches to French industrial hollowing out we divide them 
into two broad, but nevertheless not exhaustive, categories. On the one hand, the naturalist 
approach contends that deindustrialisation is a natural market-led phenomenon stemming 
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from the workings of the supply and demand side mechanisms of the market. On the other, 
the industriocratic approach, just like physiocratic thought considered agricultural activities 
as the source of a nation’s productive power, conceives of the industrial sector as the main 
engine of growth of a national economy and thus any deterioration of its position is seen as 
an economically damaging phenomenon. This classification of the literature ought not to be 
understood as an identification of two coherent and all-encompassing theoretical 
frameworks but rather as a categorisation that stresses the two main methodological 
approaches used to understand deindustrialisation and the role of the state in this process. 
The Naturalist Approach 
The point of departure of the naturalist approach is that deindustrialisation can be adequately 
explained by the in-built supply and demand side dynamics of the market. As manufacturing 
achieves higher productivity levels, its need for labour is reduced which as a result is absorbed 
by tertiary activities (Demmou, 2010: 8; Landier and Thesmar, 2013: 32-33). On the demand-
side, changing patterns of consumption also help explain the relative demise of 
manufacturing. Productivity-led decreases in manufactures’ prices as well as the general 
improvement in the population’s living standards have permitted a transformation of demand 
patterns marked by their shift towards more luxurious service products and a relative 
saturation of needs for traditional manufactures (CEPII, 2014: 1; Demmou, 2010: 14; Landier 
and Thesmar, 2013: 21; Fontagné and Lorenzi, 2005: 43). According to this explanation, the 
declining trajectory of French industrial employment since the 1970s is, in its greatest part, 
explained by technical progress and the mutation of demand at the domestic level (Daudin 
and Levasseur, 2005: 157; Fontagné and Lorenzi, 2005: 43). As such, the hasty association 
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between globalisation and deindustrialisation is refuted by the observed propensity of all 
developed economies to deindustrialise (Gazaniol, 2012: 5, 34-35). 
Additionally, there are other domestic factors that inflate manufacturing employment losses 
such as the recourse to domestic outsourcing and the reliance of manufacturing firms on 
temporary employment (Demmou, 2010: 9: Daudin and Levasseur, 2005: 139). With regards 
to the former, activities previously performed in-house by manufacturing firms, like 
marketing, conception or logistics, have increasingly become outsourced to specialist service 
providers (DATAR, 2004: 8). Similarly, manufacturing firms have since the mid-1990s 
tendentially increased their share of personnel employed through temping agencies, meaning 
that jobs actually performed within a manufacturing setting are actually classified under the 
service sector (Daudin and Levasseur, 2005: 139). These developments have, in fact, led to a 
statistical transfer of industry’s contribution to GDP and total national employment to the 
service sector (Le Blanc, 2005: p.9). 
The naturalist approach does not overlook the contribution of external factors, such as 
competition from developing countries, to deindustrialisation. Rather their interpretation 
suggests that the latter ought to be understood as reinforcing the deindustrialising tendencies 
that are already present at home (Fontagne and Lorenzi, 2005: 33). As the national economy 
opens up to international trade, price-led competitive pressures only accentuate the efforts 
of domestic industrialists to modernise and increase their productivity gains. In accordance 
with neoclassical trade theory, efficiency-seeking leads to a specialisation of domestic 
industry towards the highest value-added segments of the manufacturing chain of production 
whose capital-intensity further decreases the need for industrial labour (Fontagné and 
Lorenzi, 2005: 44-46). Domestic industry’s conversion to technologically and skill demanding 
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activities further incentivises the increasing productivity of the sector as the most efficient 
sectors within manufacturing are prioritised. As it is argued, the demise of a particular sector 
(e.g. textiles) is not always ‘bad news’ (Daudin and Levasseur, 2005: 157). Ultimately, foreign 
trade reproduces the consumer and efficiency gains that, in any way, deindustrialisation 
brings about domestically (Fontagné and Lorenzi, 2005: 14). Given that improvements in 
productivity and declining prices have led to a relative demise of manufacturing’s 
employment and GDP contributions, deindustrialisation is seen as a mere ‘optical illusion’ 
which in fact owes to a vigorous industrial performance (Chatillon, 2011: 51; Roustan, 2004: 
p.47; Fontagné and Lorenzi: 21).   
Undoubtedly, the deindustrialisation of France has not been as smooth as depicted in the 
naturalist scheme, with the pauperisation of old industrial basins in Normandy or Lorraine as 
well as persistent unemployment among low-skilled workers (Jauneau, 2009) paving the way 
for more alarmist discourses on industrial decline. However, from a naturalist lens, domestic 
distortions accompanying deindustrialisation stem from the inner deficiencies of French 
society itself (Roustan, 2004: 15). More precisely, regional and social dislocations betray the 
failure of public policy to follow and adapt to the modernising movement of this industrial 
mutation. Macroeconomic policy choices or labor market regulations have a far wider impact 
on the domestic state of employment than economic globalisation (Fontagné and Lorenzi, 
2005: 19). Regional pockets of unemployment could, for instance, be understood as 
manifestations of the failure of current labour training procedures or of inflexibilities within 
the labour market that prevent the formation of a labour force adapted to the transformed 
needs of the industrial sector such as the higher demand for skilled labour (Fontagné and 
Lorenzi, 2005: 19; Roustan, 2004: 9).  
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In sum, the naturalist perspective on France’s deindustrialisation suggests that the shrinking 
size of the manufacturing sector is a natural phenomenon that manifests its healthy overall 
performance. On the other hand, the adverse social effects that have accompanied it are 
agency-led and more precisely state-led as they manifest the failure of macroeconomic 
policies to adapt to new market requirements. Political authorities cannot halt the 
deindustrialising tendency of the country but their capacity to deploy a set of policies capable 
of adjusting French society to a mutated industrial setting is of crucial importance. 
The Industriocratic Approach 
The foundational assumption of the industriocratic approach is that industry is the sole source 
of a nation’s wealth (Le Tellier and Torres, 1993: 11). It is the peculiar properties of the 
manufacturing sector that permit it to establish itself as a national economy’s engine of 
growth on whose performance the health of other economic activities relies (Coriat and 
Taddéi, 1993: 63). Manufacturing is not a mere auxiliary activity which can be disposed of by 
national economies, but instead constitutes the backbone of the economy itself and the 
lifeblood of its productive base (Artus and Virard, 2011: 19; Colletis, 2012: 13). It follows, that 
deindustrialisation is understood as a crisis-signalling rather than a healthy evolution. 
The magnitude of this crisis becomes manifest in France’s comparative performance within 
the international market which is the tell-tale sign of its industrial sector’s weaknesses (Levet, 
1989: 3-6, Artus and Virard, 2011: 19-20). For instance, Cohen and Buigues (2014: 30,35) while 
admitting that there is a statistical trickery at play that conceals industry’s actual economic 
contribution, contend that the data capturing France’s international conduct in manufactures 
trade unassailably betrays its weak industrial performance vis-à-vis its trading partners. 
Declining market shares in manufacturing products, growing deficits in France’s trade balance 
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and the falling contribution of exports in goods in total GDP are considered as the prime 
indicators of France’s deindustrialisation (Le Franc, 1983: 27; Giraud and Weil, 2013: 51; Artus 
and Virard, ibid: 79; Mustar, 2016: 308).   
The opening up of the economy and the emergence of industrial competitors from the 
developing world do not translate into an ordered and harmonious process of trade 
specialisation among the participating countries as the neoclassical model would have it (Le 
Franc, 1983: 88, 92; Artus and Virard, 2011: 77-79). The fragmentation and geographical 
relocation of the manufacturing process towards late industrialisers dismantles the 
coherence of the domestic productive base as this process entails simultaneously an 
abandonment of all the high-skilled tertiary activities associated with manufacturing and 
disturbs domestic supplier-purchaser relations (Cohen and Buigues, 2014: 55; Colletis, 2012: 
17). At the same time, this transfer of competences encourages developing countries to 
mimic the know-how and technological practices of developed economies threatening to 
displace the initial industrial edge held by the latter (Cohen and Buigues, ibid: 56; Giraud and 
Weil, ibid: p.106). Unlike, other developed countries’ industrial sectors, such as the Swedish 
or the German, France has been unable to upgrade the innovative content of its products and 
move upmarket (Cohen and Buigues, 2014). Therefore, the global distribution of 
manufacturing activities is determined by industrial developments and strategies pursued 
domestically rather than the overarching logic of the trade specialisation model.  
Explanations over the precise roots of French industrial decline might differ among 
industriocratic authors, but nevertheless one can notice a recurrent stress of the state’s 
failure to redress France’s industrial base in the phase of the growing competitive pressures 
accompanying globalisation. For instance, it is often noticed that with the onset of France’s 
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industrial crisis in the mid-1970s industrial policy was compromised by policymakers’ concern 
to mitigate social contestation and avoid the necessary drastic restructuring required in order 
to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic industry (Levet, 1989: 34; Le Franc, 1983: 181). 
Characteristically, Cohen (1989) in his masterful L’Etat Brancardier argues that from 1974 to 
1984 the state restricted itself to a socio-political management of industrial decline in order 
to prevent the escalation of conflict by spreading in time the redundancies or plant closures 
of firms experiencing economic difficulties without treating the deep deficiencies of French 
industry. Ultimately, it is observed that with the end of the trentes glorieuses, the state 
progressively relinquished its industrial ambition and the strategic role it had in spurring 
industrial development (Colletis, 2012: 90; Thibault, 2008: 62-70).  
The abandonment of a strategic industrial policy was followed by a discordance between the 
macroeconomic policies endorsed by governments since the 1970s and the contemporary 
prerequisites for a developed economy’s competitive industrial base- as is the shift from 
price-competitiveness to quality-based competition (Colletis, 2012: 88; Cohen and Buigues, 
2014: 340). Contemporary French industrial policy is marked by its reluctance to redeploy the 
industrial sector’s strengths by promoting the execution of grand industrial programs (Cohen, 
2007: 225). While this approach does not overlook the involvement of public authorities in 
industrial affairs, it is argued that in recent decades such interventions have been 
characterised by their limited scope and lack of an overarching industrial logic. For Cohen 
(2007: 225), such is the case of the regional clusters policy (poles de competitivité) which is 
being undermined by diverging ‘parochial’ interests competing for a scarce amount funds, 
while Colletis (2012: 88-93) notes that since the 1980s the state has excessively focused on 
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promoting the interests of big firms (e.g. Alcatel, Framatome) at the expense of the interests 
of the wider industrial sector. 
To summarise, for the industriocratic tradition deindustrialisation is a metonym for industrial 
decline. It is an economically unsettling, but reversible, condition that manifests the 
dismantlement of France’s productive base. In this vein, the state has the potential to engage 
in a more active industrial policy which could potentially propel a reindustrialisation of the 
country and reverse the deindustrialisation trend. 
DEINDUSTRIALISATION AS INDUSTRIAL STATECRAFT 
The review of the literature reveals that France’s deindustrialisation consists of a process of 
selection of the industries that will persist in an era of increasingly globalised industrial 
competition. From the naturalist point of view this selectivity operates, as it were, 
automatically through the concurrent effects of domestic market-led developments and the 
materialisation of the trade specialisation thesis. In contrast, from an industriocratic 
perspective this selection process operates in a more unpredictable manner given the failure 
of the state to strategically coordinate this process.  It is the outcome of the competitive 
struggle between France and its better performing commercial partners that deteriorates the 
country’s industrial positions. However, as it is contended here, both approaches overlook 
the extent to which industrial or macroeconomic policy can actively participate in designing 
this selection process and encouraging deindustrialisation (Hudson, 1986a; Martin, 1986:284-
285). Indeed, these views convey that deindustrialisation has been determined by evolutions 
that have escaped the state’s control. In the naturalist perspective, the state can only play a 
supporting role, whereby macroeconomic policies are adapted to the newly formed industrial 
landscape (e.g. through adopting the appropriate labour training systems) or a distorting one 
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(e.g. by maintain labour market rigidities) that disturbs the natural occurrence of 
deindustrialisation.  In the industriocratic vein, the state is conspicuous by its absence and has 
refrained from preventing industrial decline. It follows, the deindustrialising trajectory of 
France has been traced heteronomously with the political sphere having passively assisted to 
the country’s industrial mutation. The lack of deeper engagement with the state can be 
remedied by defining deindustrialisation neither as a purely structural process nor as 
economic decline as the naturalists and industriocrats respectively argue, but as an industrial 
statecraft strategy. Such an exercise will deepen the insights of the existing approaches. 
In fact, the competing theses are neither inherently incorrect nor mutually exclusive: 
productivity-led deindustrialisation and deindustrialisation resulting from declining 
performance can in fact coexist within a national territory and contribute simultaneously to 
manufacturing hollowing out (Alderson, 1999: 706). The article’s claim however, is that state 
incentives can play a crucial in strategically promoting these two forms of deindustrialisation 
across and within sectors.  More precisely, a productivity-led decrease of industrial labour 
presupposes the investing capacity of firms to undertake such a technological leap. Yet, this 
is precisely what a great part of the French industrial sector was lacking from the mid-1970s 
to the early 1980s, during the most intense period of deindustrialisation as the general 
slowdown in the rate of return brought a downward pressure in the self-financing capacity of 
firms and a consequent drop in investment (OECD, 1984). During this investment drought, 
state-led initiatives of a varying nature (nationalisations, subsidised loans, tax breaks, rescue 
packages, sectoral plans) played a crucial role in allowing firms to liberate the necessary funds 
to introduce labour-saving technologies.  
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In addition, doubt can be cast upon claims about the spontaneous formation of an 
international division of labour in the light of international market openness. Indeed, the 
naturalist approach universalises the experience of industrial sectors across countries and 
reduces the study of their evolution to their immutable techno-economic aspects while 
disregarding the social and historical foundations that lead to the adoption of particular 
industrial strategies and preferences within a sector (Boyer, 1991: 29; Julien and Smith, 2011: 
366). Furthermore, as Petit (1986: 63) argues, there is nothing irreversible in the decline of 
traditional industries in developed economies since their relative technological proficiency 
can in fact allow them to revitalise and modernise such sectors. In this respect, the ‘Politics 
of Industry’ approach advanced by Julien and Smith (2008) goes to great lengths to show the 
non-deterministic relationship between globalisation and the evolutions within a particular 
industrial sector.  As it is argued, rather than a one-sided process determined externally by 
market forces, the changing patterns of organisation within an industry are to a large extent 
configured by the strategic and political interactions of public and private agents operating 
within it (Julien and Smith, 2008: 202).  
On the industriocratic side, certain authors are right to point out that at times industrial 
competitiveness concerns have been sidestepped to the benefit of more socially oriented 
issues. Indeed, as of the end of the trentes glorieuses the state was characterised by its 
inclination to ‘bailout lame ducks’ so as to avert the escalation of social conflict instead of 
encouraging the necessary and socially painful restructuring of the sector (Levy, 2013: 340; 
Hau, 2007: 35). However, mitigating the social repercussions of drastic restructuring 
measures is only one side of the coin of the pressures faced by governmental authorities when 
devising industrial strategies (Block, 1987: 127). At the same time, increasing 
internationalisation forces governments to endorse rationalisation measures in order to 
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refurbish industrial structures and increase their competitive potential by eliminating 
obsolete units. In short, social appeasement and the pursuit of economic competitiveness are 
two inescapable constraints that industrial policy makers must deal with. 
On a broader conceptual level, the aforementioned two dimensions in which policy-makers 
are enmeshed have been theorised in terms of the accumulation and legitimation constraints 
that weigh upon contemporary capitalist states (Watson 2009: 259; Rogers, 2013). More 
precisely, policy-makers must ensure the undisturbed reproduction of the domestic economy 
and its successful insertion within the global market while simultaneously securing political 
backing and minimising contestation at the domestic level (Rogers, 2013: 6; Kettell, 2004: 24). 
Still, the wedding of these objectives is a conflicting process which presents itself as a policy 
quandary for state managers as achieving a dynamic presence in international markets might 
necessitate the implementation of popularly abhorred policies (Rogers, 2009: 973). As a 
result, economic policy in general, and industrial policy in particular, is constantly forced to 
navigate between two governing objectives, namely adapting domestic economic structures 
to the conditions of global competition and averting a major political crisis directed at the 
governing elites.  
Further light on the conflictual dilemmas underpinning policy-making can be shed by the 
public policy analysis advanced by Jobert and Muller (1987: 32-33) who argue that the public 
authorities' straddling between regulation and legitimation imperatives operates even at the 
more micro-level of individual economic sectors. More precisely, it is suggested that the state 
strives to achieve the integration and adjustment of sector-specific policies to the broader 
exigencies for the reproduction of domestic society while also ensuring the legitimation of its 
overarching policy objectives by the sector's agents so as to maintain the overall cohesion of 
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the social order (Jobert and Muller 1987: 17-19, 131). As such public policy is conceived as a 
form of social mediation aiming at inscribing sectoral objectives (e.g. rationalisation of 
textiles) within the broader objectives set by the state for the whole society (e.g. industrial 
competitiveness). Focusing on the particular modalities through which existing social 
compromises are dismantled and new ones are reconfigured within individual sectors allows 
to better examine the nationally specific responses to prevailing international pressures 
(Brenac, 1994: 316, 319). Ultimately, an emphasis on the crucial role of state in adjusting 
sectoral and national objectives allows us to go beyond approaches that focus on the 
constrains that global capital mobility has unilaterally imposed on the range of policy options 
that state managers are able to mobilise (inter alia Ruggie, 1994; Rhodes, 1996; Strange, 
1994). Instead, the state is effectively conceived as the node through which domestic 
productive structures are adapted to changing international conditions (Muller, 1985: 185) as 
policymakers deploy an array of discursive and policy tools to achieve economic credibility on 
the international scene and reproduce domestic social compromises (Jobert, 1999: 84, 91-92; 
Muller, 2000: 205). After all, as Jobert and Théret (1994) argue the ‘neoliberal turn’ in French 
policy-making was not imposed by external forces but was advocated by civil servants and 
administrative elites occupying segments of the state apparatus itself.    
The preceding theoretical considerations allow for a better appreciation of industrial 
statecraft within a context of increasing internationalisation and crisis. In this vein, 
deindustrialisation can be understood as an industrial strategy that involves a state-
sponsored disengagement from selected manufacturing activities in order to rationalise the 
industrial sector as a whole and render it apt to face international competition. In other 
words, deindustrialisation as a statecraft strategy involves the selective devaluation of the 
superfluous industrial capital that impedes successful trade performance. Such a strategy is 
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conditioned by two factors. Firstly, industrial policy is by its nature selective and directed at 
the promotion of deliberately chosen sectors and firms (Chang, 1994: p.61; Landsemann 
1992; Pack and Saggi, 2006). As Chang (2009) argues: ‘In a world with scarce resources, every 
[industrial] policy choice you make, however “general” the policy may look, has 
discriminatory effects that amount to targeting’ (p.90). Inversely then, industrial policy is not 
solely confined to ‘picking winners’ but also to ‘designating losers’. Secondly, the progressive 
substitution of lagging sectors by cutthroat ones is underpinned by the political contestation 
of workers and businesses within displaced sectors (Gilpin, 1987: p.99). State involvement in 
the process industrial conversion necessarily draws contestation over the allocation of 
resources back on to itself (Evans, 1995: 6). The way out of the dilemma with which policy-
makers are faced over the allocation of public resources (Offe, 1975: 128-129) in order to 
promote certain sectors and encourage disinvestment in others necessarily entails a process 
of 'hierarchisation of sectoral policies' (Jobert and Muller, 1987: 222) which ultimately reveals 
the decisive role held by statecraft in strengthening or weakening certain sectors.  
In addition to the T&C case studied below, evidence of a state-endorsed disengagement 
strategy can be observed in other cases, as well. In 1960, in light of the rise of alternative 
energy sources, the Jeanneney plan for the state-owned French coal industry planned the 
substantial diminution of French coal production and the shutting down of various mines 
mainly located in the Centre-Midi region. In this vein, the least profitable mines whose cost 
of maintenance could not justify the drain incurred on the state's budget, were eliminated 
and coal production concentrated on the most efficient sites without having recourse to the 
socially costlier strategy of implementing cuts on the miners' earnings (Kocher-Marboeuf, 
2003: Ch.5). Additionally, since the 1970s the French state had been encouraging, through 
regional development premiums, the car constructors' strategy of progressive disengagement 
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from their ageing Parisian plants and the installation of more modern industrial units in the 
provinces. By allowing the decentralisation of the car industry and disinvestment in the ile-
de-France region, the state was able to guarantee the modernisation of the sector's industrial 
apparatus as well as to show its determination to induce the industrial reconversion of regions 
characterised by industrial decline especially in the Nord (Dormand, 2001: 95-99; Oberhauser, 
1990). Outside of France's borders, Hudson's (1986b) examination of the British case 
demonstrates the ways through which the Thatcher government actively participated in the 
deindustrialisation of North-Eastern England. In the nationalised Coal, Steel and Shipbuilding 
sectors, industrial policy sought to selectively eliminate their loss-making activities (i.e. deep 
mining, steel's inland units, ship repair and engineering) leading to a substantial 
disinvestment in the region.  Behind the deliberate disinvestment of this region, lied an 
industrial strategy aiming at creating a smaller but nevertheless more efficient national 
manufacturing base (Hudson, 1986b: 199-200). As these examples indicate, the state, juggling 
with both legitimation and accumulation concerns, can play a crucial role in orienting the 
‘shifting out’ and ‘shifting into’ certain selected manufacturing activities and areas (Cohen, 
1982).  
By focusing on the experience of the T&C industry and the way that pressures of legitimation 
and accumulation were received by the governments of the 1974-1984 decade, the 
remainder of this article will demonstrate how deindustrialisation can be effectively 
understood as process mediated and moulded by the state itself. 
THE TEXTILKES AND CLOTHING EXPERIENCE (1974-1984) 
Dominated by traditional, small and often family-owned firms that co-existed alongside few 
internationally-oriented companies (Underhill, 1990; p.194), the T&C sector was 
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characterised by its ‘archaic’ image, its antiquated managerial methods and its reluctance to 
expose itself to the international market (Benzoni, 1983; pp.106-107). It follows, that the 
post-war trajectory of the textile-clothing sector in France has been characterised by its slow 
pace of modernisation and its persistent crisis-prone tendencies (Underhil, 1988: 496).  
In order to enliven the potential of the sector, the Comité Interprofessionel de Renovation des 
Structure Industriels et Commerciales de L’Industrie Textile (CIRIT), an agency financed 
through a parafiscal levy set at 0.44% of the revenues of textile industries, was founded in 
1966 with the aim of providing grants to firms willing to merge or absorb smaller ones. Out 
of CIRIT’s eleven members seven represented the profession’s employers and five were 
representatives of public financial institutions. The endeavour to induce concentration within 
the textile industry did not eliminate its dualistic nature as the generally protectionist 
environment permitted the ‘artificial’ survival of smaller firms, which meant the sector 
tended towards a persistent state of overproduction. Mytelka (1982a) describes the situation 
in textiles as follows: ‘As the process of concentration proceeded during the 1960s, the very 
existence of a large number of less modernised firms, their ability to ‘dump’ textiles onto the 
domestic market, and the mounting pressure from international competition brought a 
downward pressure upon profits’ (p.140). The decrease of firms’ returns led to a drop in 
investment and a consequent weakening of the sector’s capacity to effectively compete in 
the international market.  As a result, in the late 1970s the sector’s trade balance went into 
deficit for the first time in its post-war trajectory. Manifestly, a radical rationalisation of the 
sector was needed in order to eliminate the superfluous industrial capital weighing on the 
sector’s performance.  
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Within the limited attention received by industrial policy towards French T&C (Mytelka, 
1982a,1982b; Mahon and Mytelka, 1983; Underhill, 1988, 1990, 1998, 2005) it is often argued 
that the corporate interests of large textile employers were of a decisive influence in guiding 
the French MoI’s positions in their favour (Mytelka, 1982a: 144; Underhill, 1998: 133-134). 
Instead, the archival findings presented in this section, in line with the article’s overarching 
argument, shows that the MoI enjoyed considerable autonomy from the sector’s corporate 
interests and the formulation of industrial policy was dictated mainly by the state’s own 
conflicting objective to secure political legitimacy while inducing a rationalisation of the sector 
in order to remedy its crisis. 
The experience of the sector is divided into three distinct episodes (1974-1979, 1980-1981, 
1981-1984) which highlight the consecutive governments’ attempt to implement a selective 
disengagement strategy along with the political and social obstacles that it encountered. 
SEEKING ‘PROFESSIONAL HELP’ (1974-1979) 
Throughout, the 1970s, the CIRIT remained the primary organ through which aids were 
provided to the T&C sector in order to confront the grave crisis it was undergoing given the 
limited support that the sector received from other established channels of industrial aids 
distribution (Poncelet, 1981: 305-315). An alternative source of funding for textile firms was 
all the more important given the wider capital shortage reigning in the sector. In a context of 
falling profits, firms were reluctant to borrow on the private market given the high costs of 
borrowing that would accompany their expensive modernising investments (Mytelka, 
1982a:141). 
As mentioned, in the 1960s, the effort to restructure the textile sector through the CIRIT was 
centred around a policy of industrial concentration. This strategy was by its nature very 
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selective as it entailed the promotion of large conglomerates and the exclusion of marginal 
firms ‘unable to contemplate mergers or takeovers’ from assistance (Underhill, 1988: p.499). 
CIRIT’s mission entailed the conduction of an orderly devaluation of uncompetitive textile 
capital and the simultaneous promotion of bigger firms capable of facing the threat of foreign 
competition. In the early 1970s the handling of intervention procedures by the CIRIT was 
based on equally restrictive criteria. From July 1971 to June 1974, the CIRIT obtained 
government authorisation to implement a program of assistance to modernisation. Aids were 
granted insofar as the investments of candidate firms were significantly higher than the 
average volume of investment within the sector1. Thus, selective disengagement was carried 
out by discriminating against smaller and uncompetitive firms in the provision of financial 
assistance. The end of the program coincided with the climax of the sector’s crisis and the 
acknowledgement of the increasingly threatening spectre of unemployment by business and 
government cycles. 
The importance of T&C employment for the stability of France’s social tissue rested, not only, 
on the fact that it occupied a considerable share of the country’s manufacturing jobs (11.6% 
in 1973) but also on its regional significance for Northern and North-Eastern France (INSEE, 
1973). In addition, even though the structure of the T&C sector based on the overwhelming 
presence of small firms acted as a natural barrier to the unionisation of labour (Berger, 1980: 
101), the strike and occupation at the Lip watch plant in 1973 had shown that even so-called 
traditional sectors were not immune to social implosions (Zukin, 1985: 357). The ‘Affaire Lip’ 
invigorated the necessity for state managers to contain and pacify social conflicts.  
 A strike at the Bouly tights and stockings plant in the city of Fourmies in the North occurring 
only weeks after the onset of the Lip strike, spread fears over the creation of a ‘new Lip’ 
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(L’Unité, 21 March 1974)2. The CIRIT and the MoI had refused to provide financial assistance 
to the firm as they deemed it economically inefficient, forcing it into bankruptcy3. The limited 
assistance received by governmental authorities in the Bouly case raised the alarm about the 
effectiveness of intervention procedures in the sector and the regional implosions that such 
a stance could inadvertently engender. In a document submitted to the CIRIT in February 
1974, the Union des Inudstries Textile (UIT), the employer’s association of the textile industry, 
was forced to admit that current procedures were ill-equipped to deal with cases ‘where 
operating difficulties experienced by firms run the risk of leading to the disappearance of jobs 
under conditions that are dangerous from a social perspective’4. Indeed, the UIT observed 
CIRIT’s lack of reflexes in the Bouly case and noted the incompatibility of its belated 
interventions with the rapid mediation required in contexts of growing social tensions5.  
The aggravation of the social crisis led to the adoption of a softer approach to grants 
distribution. Indeed, the CIRIT announced that its post-1974 intervention procedures would 
include social criteria in their motivation such as the employment-generation capacity of 
firms6. Employment concerns became such a central feature of the CIRIT’s policy that in its 9th 
annual report the committee explained that while its past policies towards marginal firms 
focused on smoothing their shut down, as of 1975 they had to take into account the grave 
repercussions on employment and thus selectively provide support to firms on the basis of 
the efforts made to re-employ the laid-off personnel7.  Similarly, the 10th annual report 
explained that in 1976 ‘the committee decided that it could not, given the prevailing 
employment conditions, incite the closing down of firms even if that would have been 
reasonable from a purely economic standpoint’8. CIRIT’s intervention procedures were, thus, 
subject to some degree of flexibilisation which was further manifest in its increasing opening 
up towards smaller and medium-sized firms9.    
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However, the CIRIT’s approach was limited by two factors. Firstly, the concern over 
employment maintenance was undermined by the rational economic planning necessitated 
by the harsh conditions imposed by global competition. For instance, the safeguard of 
production units despite the lack of viable economic motives run contrary to the 
overproduction tendencies of the sector. As an example, in May 1977 the president of the 
French Cotton Industry Federation transmitted to the CIRIT his dissatisfaction with the latter’s 
promotion of modernisation investments within the household textiles industry which 
disregarded the already overwhelming overcapacities of the sector and the limited capacity 
of the market to absorb excess products10. The prevalent overproduction tendencies in many 
subsectors of the textile industry therefore became a central concern of the CIRIT since early 
197711, forcing it to officially include a clause on the discouragement of further investment in 
sectors known for their overcapacities on April of the same year12.   
Secondly, the availability of financial resources within CIRIT’s budget rested entirely on the 
sums collected from the parafiscal tax on the industry’s revenues, its interventions being thus 
limited by budgetary considerations. In fact, given the aggravated economic climate, CIRIT’s 
expenditures significantly exceeded its incomes by 35% in 1976, 45% in 1977 and 15% in 1978, 
but was able to finance its programmes through the reserves it had accumulated during the 
previous years. In its own words, the situation was as follows: 
‘the sum of [ CIRIT’s] interventions exceeds since two years the sum of the proceeds 
from the levy for the same period. This was permitted by the existence of reserves 
while awaiting for an increase in resources to come… from certain allotments 
expected from the CAPI [Credits d’Actions de Politique Industrielle] 13 … these 
measures have not intervened so far.’14 
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The CIRIT regretfully observed that its interventions had not been supplemented by state-
financed industrial subsidies. Instead, the MoI’s preferred solution to remedy the budgetary 
imbalances of the CIRIT was to incite the latter to ‘decrease its expenses by applying a greater 
selectivity in the choice of subsidised projects’15 and step up the selective disengagement 
from uncompetitive activities. Because of financial limitations and the reliance on its own 
funds, the CIRIT was forced to restrict its field of action and concentrate its participation to 
investments which were aiming at significantly enhancing the productivity of firms16. After 
1978, the intervention procedures of the CIRIT became increasingly reminiscent of its pre-
1974 patterns of intervention as they privileged the most competitive firms whose proposed 
investment programs demarcated them from their domestic competitors. 
The first years of the textile crisis where marked by the absence of direct state involvement 
in the manner that other sectors, such as the shipbuilding or steel industry, had witnessed. 
The need for a selective disengagement from the sector, thus, operated through the scarcity 
of funds imposed upon the CIRIT. Indeed, by delegating the financial responsibility for the 
sector’s rationalisation to the professions themselves, the state restricted the CIRIT’s 
temptation to yield to social pressures to secure employment. Within a context of limited 
funds, increased selectivity became the main mechanism available for the attribution of aids. 
FROM BURDEN TO STRATEGIC SECTOR? (1980-1981) 
The main shortcoming of the CIRIT-led strategy of industrial adjustment was the impression 
that the government put the sector’s situation on the back burner as industrial policy 
prioritised the recovery of other sectors such as steel or shipbuilding which had benefitted 
from emergency plans in 1977 and 1978 accordingly. In addition, since 1979 six sectors were 
granted the ‘strategic sector’ status by the CODIS, an inter-ministerial Committee responsible 
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for identifying the economically most promising industrial activities and coordinating the 
diffusion of existing subsidies towards these sectors (i.e. office equipment, consumer 
electronics, robotics, bio-technology, underwater and energy-reducing activities). The 
political stakes of the T&C crisis were well captured by the senator of the Nord region and 
Vice-President of the Senate, Maurice Schumann, who in a 1980 letter to President Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing (VGE) explained that in order to vanquish the ‘textile anguish’ that 
proliferates in regions such as Alsace or Nord it was necessary to formulate a comprehensive 
plan rather than to contingently implement a scattered set of measures17. Even further, he 
argued that:  
‘The best course of action and one whose moral impact will be considerable is, of 
course, to apply on textiles the CODIS procedures. If it becomes the seventh 
prioritised sector, the 600,000 textile and clothing workers will cease to, worryingly, 
lend an ear to those who tell them that public authorities are resigned to the demise 
of their livelihood and focus the totality of their efforts on cutting-edge 
technologies.’18  
On the 5th of November 1980, five months prior to the electoral confrontation with the 
socialists, the MoI announced the integration of T&C into the CODIS scheme and their official 
consolidation as a key sector for the reinforcement of France’s industrial tissue. As put by 
Bobe (1983) later in a World Bank working paper: ‘On the eve of the last elections, in a 
somewhat unusual move, textiles were added to...[the] high priority sectors. Clearly, political 
necessity makes its own laws’ (p.19). 
Underpinning the design of the new plan was the observation that the state should be the 
key formulator of the strategic aims necessary for increasing the international 
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competitiveness of the sector19.  Without a decisive public intervention, the T&C industrialists 
would adopt a defensive strategy and retreat from the international scene20. The necessity to 
concede the delineation of the sector’s blueprint to the state was a concern shared not only 
among public figures but within the profession as well21. Breaking with the policy of the first 
years of the crisis, the government was now forced to assume the political and financial 
responsibilities of the sector’s recovery from the crisis. 
However, the government’s changing attitude towards T&C did not entail an at ‘all costs’ 
attempt to save the totality of the sector, as this idea was dismissed in a CODIS reunion in July 
1980 22 . Rather, it consisted of a targeted deindustrialisation effort underpinned by an 
increasing selectivity with regards to the choice of destination of public aids. While, previously 
the selective disengagement strategy operated through the scarcity of CIRIT’s funds, it was 
now achieved by way of prioritising specific segments of the industry and leaving the rest to 
the fate of international competition. Thus, the state was resigned to accept a limited trade 
deficit with developing countries in hosiery garments and apparels, while aiming to stabilise 
or even achieve a surplus with the country’s developed counterparts in more sophisticated 
products such as chemical textiles23. Overall, this ‘ordered deindustrialisation’ strategy was 
guided by a double aim to firstly, contain the degradation of France’s trade balance in T&C 
products by limiting the deficit at 20,000 million francs despite the employers’ call for greater 
protectionism24 and secondly, to slow down the disappearance of jobs and instead of the 
projected 40,000-50,000 yearly job losses to bring this rate down to the more ‘acceptable 
proportions’ of around 15,000-20,000 yearly job losses25. As described by the MoI France’s 
T&C policy was one of ‘selective protectionism’ 26  aiming at maintaining the core of the 
sector’s potential while allowing the fading away of its superfluous elements. Since, under 
the prevailing conditions a complete disengagement from the sector was socially as well as 
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economically impermissible 27 , the state intended to implement a strategy permitting a 
temporary political palliation of the undergoing social disruptions while limiting its 
intervention to the commercially most strategic sub-sectors.  
Based on a study by the PEAT MARWICK MITHCELL and Co consultant agency charged with 
analysing the expected growth of the various international T&C markets, the MoI sought to 
identify the main T&C clusters that should be prioritised through the CODIS’s actions. 
Ultimately, these were reduced down to nine in September 1980 and included: women’s 
leisure trousers, sports clothing, dyeing and finishing of fabrics, textile printing, textiles for 
the automobile industry, textiles for medical usage, geo-textiles and other textiles destined 
for technical and industrial use 28 . The choice of industrial direction made by French 
authorities was, thus, motivated by an intention to selectively disengage from production 
oriented towards the saturated T&C markets in which production in developing countries had 
taken the upper hand and to orient the domestic industry’s productive potential towards new 
markets growing faster than average 29 . In contrast to naturalist interpretations, the 
adaptation of domestic industry to the upmarket segments of the market could not occur 
automatically. As it was observed French firms had failed to implant themselves in markets 
that had been proved to be more lucrative for developed economies. As such the CODIS 
procedures played a crucial role in kickstarting the market niche specialisation of French T&C. 
Through this strategy of specialisation aiming at capturing ‘virgin’ markets the government 
hoped to reconcile the aim of stabilising the trade deficit and preserving certain jobs within 
the French territory. 
The rationally planned intervention of the CODIS stood in direct contrast with the political 
discourse attached to it which initially implied a global attempt to level up the totality of the 
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T&C sector. The government was well aware of the limited scope of its industrial aims and its 
inaptitude to appease the growing social dissatisfaction over the proliferation of firms’ 
closures and most importantly the rapid progression of imports, ‘the source of all evils’30. 
Originally, the CODIS concealed its sub-sectorial selectivity from the public, the media and the 
industrialists by fear of being accused of applying an arbitrary selection process and, thus, 
preferred to publicise its aids as being, more generally, available for all firms undertaking 
strategical and innovative investments 31. However, in the eve of the presidential elections, 
the cabinet of the MoI realised in the nick of time the necessity to adopt a new set of trade-
related measures with ‘political and psychological scopes’ in order to show the government’s 
determination32. Ultimately, these considerations culminated in the adoption of the March 
1981 governmental measures regarding the reinforcement of import controls. These 
measures promised a more stringent supervision of imports (e.g. measures against fraud, 
exact respect of import quotas) and a stricter application of the GATT’s safeguard provisions 
– such as the article XIX or ‘escape clause’- permitting to hamper the rate of imports in sectors 
where domestic industry is highly vulnerable to soaring imports. 
Overall, within a politically and socially charged climate the government was forced to adopt 
a more interventionist stance in the T&C industry during the last year of VGE’s rule. However, 
the plan was devised too late and too hastily to produce any visible results. With the trade 
deficit having been further aggravated during 1980 plunging to 3,400 million francs and the 
workforce having lost some 37,000 workers in only one year, labour failed to reap any benefits 
from the government’s measures. The government’s attempted strategy to deindustrialise 
the sector in an orderly fashion through the selective promotion of key T&C clusters while 
simultaneously sending workers reassuring signals of a comprehensive plan failed to yield the 
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expected political results as industrial policy was now handed over to Mitterrand’s socialist 
government. 
DEINDUSTRIALISATION DELAYED (1981-1984) 
According, to Mitterrand there were no condemned sectors, not even the so-called traditional 
sectors T&C included; industrial policy was to be determined publicly instead of succumbing 
to the prerogatives of the international division of labour (Mitterrand, 1982). The objective 
to recover domestic industry through a recapturing of the domestic market gave a heavily 
politicised flavour to industrial policy and as a consequence raised the tension between the 
economic imperatives of rationalisation and the social responsibilities of the recently elected 
government.  
Announced in November 1981, the principal novelty of the socialists’ plan for textiles was the 
introduction of a clause on the relief in firms’ social contributions. The latter, which 
was officially termed Employment-Investment Contracts (CEI) and launched in March 
1982, instituted a system of social contributions reduction of 12%, 10% and 8% with the aim 
of helping firms to liberate enough funds to finance their investments in new 
technologies. The attribution of rates of relief obeyed to a hierarchical logic whereby the best-
performing firms would be eligible for a 12% relief while those in a less healthy situation, but 
in better one than those not signing a contract at all, would receive the 10% rate33. Attached 
to the CEIs were two conditions. The first one concerned investment levels and demanded 
from firms seeking to obtain the 12% and 10% deduction to undertake 
investments reaching 1.5% of their revenues. The second condition concerned employment 
and demanded from firms to seek the re-employment of laid off workers. The 8% deduction 
was an exceptional clause as it was introduced for struggling firms residing in regions which 
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would have been acutely destabilised in social and economic terms if these firms where to 
shut down34. As open and far-reaching as the plan was, the best performing firms and those 
less affected by the crisis constituted the fulcrum of the government's T&C policy35. In a sense, 
the selective disengagement from less efficient T&C facilities still persisted in the Socialists’ 
approach albeit in a significantly diluted form. 
Indeed, the first year, of the CEI's application was rather undiscriminating as around 3,000 
firms (66% of the sector's firms) were able to sign such contracts and when it did discriminate 
it did so towards smaller firms while making sure that all big textile firms participated in the 
plan36. However, its effects were more mitigated. As explained by the MoI in a letter to the 
Prime Minister: ‘The first results of a year-long application of this procedure were socially very 
satisfying but economically absolutely insufficient’37.  While from a social perspective the CEIs 
managed to spectacularly refrain the surge of layoffs limiting them to 7,000 in 1982, the 
economic effects were much less pronounced as the sector's trade performance proved to be 
rather poor with the trade deficit doubling from 4,000 million francs to 8,000 million francs 
the following year.  
Satisfied by the policy’s popularity among the public and the overall net political gains for the 
government38, the MoI decided to push for a renewal of the contracts despite their mediocre 
results on France's external commerce.  Indeed, as 1983 was going to be a predictably harsh 
year for the sector, in the absence of CEIs an increase in laying offs would have been blamed 
on the lack of government initiative39 given that the regional concentration of employment 
put industrial policy in the public eye40.  
At the same time rampant inflation and the speculative pressures on the Franc which had 
been devalued twice since 1981 rendered budgetary rigour all the more pressing in order to 
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restore credibility within international financial markets (Lordon, 1998: 101). Thus, the 
Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of the Budget disapproved the renewal of the CEIs 
defending a position of less assistance to the sector as a way to consolidate budgetary 
restraint 41 . Similar concerns were expressed by state administrators working within the 
Commissariat Général du Plan. For instance, Jean Cheval had argued that the sectoral plan 
was setting ‘a dangerous precedent’ as the political motivations underpinning the plan were 
privileging employment objectives over industrial ones42. However, as noted by Mitterrand’s 
industrial advisor, Alain Boulbil, in essence the government’s plan was concerned with 
slowing down the rate of employment decrease as opposed to halt its overall decline.43 In 
short, intra-state conflicts over the textile plan were mainly centred around its financial cost 
and the pace of implementation of the selective disengagement strategy as opposed to the 
latter’s necessity. Ultimately, following the interministerial councils of February 1983 the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet sided in favour of the MoI’s proposal44. 
This debate was exported to the supranational level, as the EEC also argued for an increased 
selectivity in the attribution of aids especially in sectors already known for their overcapacities 
at the European level45. For the Commission “there [were] too many people in the EEC’s 
textile for a few places in the sun”46. To abide by the accumulation imperatives mediated by 
the EEC while simultaneously reaping the domestic political benefits of the CEIs, the latter 
were reinvigorated in early 1983 but operated with greater selectivity. Thus, the 
conditions attached to CEIs became stricter: while the exigencies on the re-employment of 
laid off workers were flexibilised47, the minimum investments necessary for CEI eligibility 
increased by 70% for textiles and by 40% for clothing with the UIT lamenting that a great 
number of firms that signed a contract in 1982 would not be able to do so in 198348. Overall, 
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during the second year of the CEIs application, a somewhat greater degree of selectivity was 
applied but nevertheless the contracts englobed 2,500 firms or 50% of the sector.  
Well aware of the palliative nature of its assistance towards the sector, the MoI had argued 
that both the protectionist stance against developing counties imports defended by French 
authorities in the EEC as well as the textile plan itself were of a transitory nature. Indeed, the 
protection of domestic producers through the concluded Multi Fibre Agreements were 
serving only as a breathing room for firms to modernise and adapt to global market 
conditions49. Similarly, in the MoI’s view, if the CEIs continued indefinitely firms would never 
become competitive on their own50. As it were, both the ending of the textile plan and the 
lifting of imports were considered by the socialist government as a precondition for the 
resumption of competitiveness by the sector’s firms. Therefore, the essential aim of the CEIs 
and the strict monitoring of imports was to refrain the urge of firms to proceed to massive 
layoffs in order to delay the negative political impact of an inevitable growth in 
unemployment. As Hayward (1986: 235) puts it, Mitterrand was simply delaying ‘the day of 
reckoning’. 
In 1984, amidst strident discontent from the UIT which was particularly attached to the CEIs51, 
the government decided not to renew them and instead sought to accelerate the strategy of 
selective disengagement. The successor plan was already being devised in early 198352 in 
order to obtain more tangible results in the competitiveness of firms than the CEIs. Using an 
annual budget amounting to a yearly 150 million francs collected from the parafiscal T&C tax, 
the Committee for the Promotion of Textile and Clothing Products (CDPDTH) was charged 
with subsidising loans for a limited number of firms planning investments in new technologies 
such as computer assisted processes, robotisation of spinning, automatization of knitting and 
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weaving etc53. Another indispensable feature of the CDPDTH’s plan of action consisted in the 
promotion of French products in domestic and foreign markets with fashion products gaining 
a newfound prominence in the MoIs’ plans54. Again, the targeted promotion of the sector’s 
exports would not be indiscriminately accessible to all applicant firms but would involve a 
strict top-down process of selection of the firms that were the most likely to implant 
themselves in foreign markets 55 . As it was understandably asked within the MoI: ‘Is 
it…desirable to continue subsidising firms…that after several years of marketing have never 
been able to penetrate the market and would in all likelihood never have any chance of 
success [?]’56. 
However, the adoption of yet another aid package for the sector was met with resistance 
within the government. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy, Finances and the Budget had 
consistently argued against the continuation of parafiscal-financed method of loans 
subsidisation as it believed that it would constitute an ‘economically dangerous choice’57 
that would only hinder the natural competition between industrial networks58. The Ministry 
of the Economy, thus, stood for a stricter market-led adjustment of the textile industry and 
the abolition of the system of aids.  
After a prolonged juridical dispute with the EEC, the program of subsidised loans was rejected. 
At last, the French government adopted the initial prescriptions of the Ministry of the 
Economy and abandoned the idea of a comprehensive plan of financial assistance to T&C with 
the CDPDTH restricting its actions to the second component of its project namely the targeted 
promotion of French T&C exports. Industrial policy towards textiles therefore became limited 
to a state-backed ‘marketing’ of firms with the highest aptitude to capture foreign markets 
while the less successful firms were destined to decline. However, in contrast to the 
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industriocratic definition, such decline did not manifest a lack of industrial strategy but was 
essentially a core compoment of the government’s industrial preferences since the MoI itself 
ultimately refused to distribute funds to uncompetitive firms only to maintain them alive 
artificially59.  
Under the socialists, the selective disengagement strategy of the previous governments was 
mitigated by their concern to build political backing within the sector’s agents. The strategy 
of selective disengagement did not disappear under their rule, but was watered down for the 
first two years of Mitterrand’s presidency, before the adoption of the MoE’s proposal for a 
more brutal adaptation of the sector to foreign competition. While the legal constraints 
imposed by the EEC were a fundamental barrier to the continuation of a publicly financed 
modernisation of the sector, the abandonment of the aid package was at the same time a 
policy preference expressed by civil servants operating within the MoE and other agencies. 
Thus, the pressure to end textile assistance did not come solely from the outside but also 
within the state itself. As Cohen (1982: 25) had anticipated, market-led adjustments in lagging 
sectors were in fact state-controlled processes in which ‘laissez-faire’ discourses acted as a 
legitimation device for their unbridled realisation. 
CONCLUSION 
 This article first confronted two common strands of the literature on deindustrialisation. 
Within the latter, the naturalist approach defines this phenomenon as a natural 
transformation of a developed economy’s industrial sector while for the industriocratic 
approach deindustrialisation is synonymous with industrial decline. In contrast, this article 
has proposed an alternative definition of deindustrialisation as a statecraft strategy that 
involves a process of selective disengagement from certain manufacturing activities in order 
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to stimulate the rationalisation of industry and enhance its commercial performance. It was 
argued that the unfolding of this industrial strategy is better captured by considering the 
accumulation and legitimation imperatives that weigh upon contemporary capitalist states. 
The experience of the T&C sector served as an illustration of the French state’s pivotal role in 
the process of deindustrialisation. The key aspect of these successive governments' industrial 
policies was the selectivity applied to the distribution of aids which entailed a top-down 
selection of the production units that would survive the crisis and constitute the hard core of 
domestic T&C production and a consequent marginalisation of firms less apt to figure in the 
sector's nucleus. This selectivity underwent through three distinct phases. From 1974 until 
the late 1970s the government ignored the economic and social ills manifested in the sector 
and relegated their management to the industrialists-dominated committee, the CIRIT. 
Industrial selectivity became the CIRIT's task. Its financial resources were too weak to allow it 
to formulate a comprehensive textile plan englobing the totality of the sector, forcing it to be 
sparing in its distribution of aids. In the early 1980s, largely due to growing political pressures 
from the opposition as well as the proliferation of unemployed voters, VGE's government 
proposed an extensive textile package seemingly destined to all T&C firms without 
discrimination, but in practice mobilised for a limited number of firms pertaining to 
strategically selected T&C clusters. With the election of a socialist government, industrial 
policy first attempted to delay the disengagement process and applied comparatively weak 
selectivity criteria in its administration of aids. After the short-lived attempt to delay the 
coming devaluation in the sector, the government sided with Ministry of the Economy’s 
recommendations of a market-led adjustment whereby the devaluation process would be, 
ultimately, decided by international competition with the state confining itself to a selective 
promotion of the sector’s exports. 
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The lessons drawn from the T&C experience point out that deindustrialisation can effectively 
be conceived as state-sponsored strategy which involves a targeted disengagement from 
certain manufacturing areas. Within the context of the debates over France’s ongoing 
industrial hollowing out two main conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the naturalness of 
France’s deindustrialisation and transition to a service-dominated economy is questionable. 
As it was shown, the country’s industrial mutation was to a great extent favoured by industrial 
policy-makers and, thus, was moulded by the political objectives of governing authorities. 
Secondly, light should be also cast upon the limits of the state’s capacity to completely reverse 
the deindustrialisation tide. In a context of increasing internationalisation and scarce 
resources, the targeted disengagement from lagging sectors and firms crops up as a 
tantalising policy option for industrial policy-makers. 
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